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ABSTRACT:  Reconciliation between countries following a war or a
series of wars has attracted little scholarly attention as a phenomenon to be
studied even though it receives journalistic coverage and past cases of
reconciliation have been extensively described.  This paper uses four
international events datasets to explore whether reconciliation events have
a discernible impact on the relations between countries, and if so, the
nature of that impact.  The paper describes the objectives of this project,
the hypotheses tested, the data used, and the results obtained.  The results
suggest that reconciliation events have an impact, at least in some cases. 
However, limitations of the data constrain what can be asserted.  The
paper then discusses how to continue this research by linking to other
research questions and theoretical schools and by focusing our next study
on eight cases.
The authors wish to thank Sara Jones for her research assistance with this
paper, Rodney Tomlinson for making available the WEIS dataset, Phil
Schrodt for making available his Levant dataset, and Doug Bond for
making available data from his PANDA project.  Of course, none of these
individuals bears any responsibility for errors or omissions in the paper.
INTRODUCTION
Since the writings of Hobbes and Locke, a fundamental political
question is why individuals enter into, and how they maintain, civil society
despite competition and conflict among individual actors.  A variety of
formal and informal work acknowledges the tension between aggressive
behavior and societal harmony and points to the importance of
reconciliation—returning to peace, harmony, or amicable relations after a
conflict—as integral to mitigating future violence and maintaining societal
stability.
Consider three recordings of the role of reconciliation in very disparate
"societies."  The first incident is described by ethologist Frans de Waal (de
Waal, 1989, p. 5).  He recalls witnessing a fight in the chimpanzee colony
of the Arnhem Zoo:
It was the winter of 1975 and the colony was kept indoors.  In
the course of a charging display, the dominant male attacked a
female, which caused screaming chaos as other chimpanzees
came to her defense.  When the group finally calmed down, an
unusual silence followed, with nobody moving, as if the apes
were waiting for something.  Suddenly the entire colony burst
out hooting, while one male worked the large metal drums in
the corner of the hall.  In the midst of the pandemonium I saw
two chimpanzees kiss and embrace. . .   the embracing
individuals had been the same male and female of the initial
fight.
A second observation comes from the seventeenth century letters of
American author Samuel Sewall (Hendrickson, 1987, p. 90).  He captured
the following ceremony of native Americans of the northeast colonies in
1680:
Meeting with the Sachem they came to an agreement and
buried two axes in the ground . . . which ceremony to them is
more significant and binding than all the Articles of Peace, the
hatchet being a principle weapon.
Three centuries later, contemporary historian Hendrick Smith described
the signing of a peace treaty and the public joining of hands between
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of
Israel, and President Jimmy Carter of the United States (Smith, 1979, A1):
The elusive, unprecedented peace treaty that Egypt and Israel
signed today has enormous symbolic importance and the
potential for fundamentally transforming the map and history
of the entire region . . . the best diplomatic estimate here is
that the treaty has markedly reduced the risk of a major war in
the Middle East for a considerable time . . .
Notably, each description contains the implicit or explicit hypothesis that
future violence is less likely to occur, and "societal" order more likely to
be maintained, if the parties to a conflict engage in a formal, public
process of reconciliation.  This is a powerful, yet untested assumption
despite pervasive references to reconciliation in popular discussions of
intra- and international conflicts.1  
This paper considers what effect, if any, the role reconciliation has at
the level of "international society."2  It asks, does public reconciliation
between national belligerents reduce the outbreak of future conflict and
lead to more amicable relations?  If reconciliation matters in this context,
can we refine our insight to say under what circumstances reconciliation is
more or less likely to occur and by what mechanisms reconciliation
restores amicable relations between parties and impedes future conflicts?3  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The immediate research questions we wish to answer concerning how
does a reconciliation event affect relations between former combatants are:
- Do relations between former combatants improve
following the reconciliation event?
- Do relations between former combatants improve
relative to their long-term relations before the conflict?
- When comparing across a number of post-conflict
situations, do relations between former combatants that
experience a reconciliation event subsequently exhibit less
conflictual interactions than the subsequent (post-conflict)
relations between former combatants that did not have a
reconciliation event?
- Does the reconciliation event precede an improvement
in relations or is it simply a stage in an already ongoing
improvement?
As derived from analogous social science literature referred to earlier, we
define a "reconciliation event" as one that typically includes the following
elements:  (1) direct physical contact or proximity between opponents,
usually the senior representatives of the respective states; (2) a public
ceremony accompanied by substantial publicity or media attention that
relays the event to the wider national societies; and (3) ritualistic or
symbolic behavior that indicates the parties consider the quarrel resolved
and that more amicable relations are expected to follow.  Often the signing
of a treaty incorporates these three elements, and, in practice, is the
embodiment of a reconciliation.
HYPOTHESES TESTED
We intend to test the following hypotheses regarding the impact of
reconciliation on international relations:
1. The relations between former combatants improve following a
reconciliation event.
2. Relations between former combatants that have a reconciliation
do not improve compared to their long-term relations before the
conflict.
3. Those former belligerents that experience a reconciliation event
subsequently exhibit better relations than those former belligerents
that did not have a reconciliation event.
4. The reconciliation event is more than simply another step in
improving relations.  It is at minimum an inflection point at which
the rate of change in the improvement of relations increases.  In other
cases it is an inflection point at which the nature of the relations
changes from declining or essentially unchanging to improving.
Hypotheses 1 and 3 are straightforward given the research questions. 
Hypothesis 2 may seem unusual, but it is consistent with the theoretical
proposition that reconciliation is an act to restore and, over the long term,
maintain societal comity.  We expect that reconciliation will not, in
general, directly alter the long-term interests of the parties.  For that reason
we expect that relations following a reconciliation would at most only
temporarily rise to a higher level than the long-term state of relations. 
Hypothesis 4 also requires further explanation.  We are positing that the
reconciliation event can be recognized as a positive turning point in
relations.  This is a stronger hypothesis than hypothesis 1, which only
asserts that relations improve following a reconciliation event.  With
hypothesis 1 a reconciliation event could simply be in the middle of a
uniform trend towards better relations or could even be the point at which
an improvement in relations slows down and the hypothesis would still be
true. 
PROCEDURE OF ANALYSIS AND DATA SOURCES USED
To test the hypotheses enumerated above, we combine three sets of
information.  The first is a catalogue of interstate wars from 1888 to 1991. 
The country dyads involved in these wars serve as the primary units of
analysis.  We obtained our list of wars and major participants—and thus
dyads—from the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDS) dataset (version
2.10) that is available on the Internet at:
http://www.polsci.binghamton.edu/peace(s)/mid_data.htm
and whose nature is described in Gochman and Moaz (1984) and
Gochman and Leng (1988).  From that dataset we extracted a list
consisting of 53 interstate wars.  That list can be found in Appendix A. 
From that list we identified 114 country dyads for whom a reconciliation
was—at least in principle—feasible.  A listing of these dyads can be found
in Appendix B.  Dyad members had to have fought against each other in at
least one war.  In many instances dyad members had fought multiple wars
in the time frame of the study.
We use the time period 1888 to 1991 to address time lags.  The latter
date is used because a war must have concluded before a reconciliation
event becomes feasible and because our primary relationship datasets
(discussed below) end in 1992.  The time frame begins at 1888 because of
the combination of two factors.  First, we need some upper limit in the
time delay for what can reasonably be considered a reconciliation.  That
the participants need to be alive is a plausible criterion, and sixty years is a
reasonable upper limit for participants in a war to still be in positions to
make a reconciliation for their countries.  Second, our relationship datasets
begin at 1948; a sixty year delay puts us back to 1888.
The second set of information is reconciliation events.  We sought to
divide the 114 dyads into two groups, those that have experienced
reconciliation following a war and those that have not.  This categorization
is necessary to test the hypotheses.  Consequently, we assembled a dataset
of reconciliation events between the countries in the dyads identified from
the MIDS dataset.  These data have been collected by the authors from
historiographic study of each of the countries and their relationships with
their dyadic "partners" subsequent to the wars between them.  The list of
reconciliation events is found in Appendix C.  We then coded each dyad in
Appendix B for reconciliation or its absence.
The third set of information is the status or condition over time of the
relationship between the countries in the dyads.  These are the relationship
patterns referred to in the hypotheses.  We obtained measures of this these
relationships from four sources.  The first two are the COPDAB and WEIS
datasets (Azar, 1980a; Azar, 1980b; Davies and McDaniel, 1994;
Tomlinson, 1993; Tomlinson, 1996).  Both of these datasets are well
known and have been used for a number of studies.  They store in
chronological sequence the history of reported cooperative and hostile acts
directed from individual countries to other individual countries.  COPDAB
covers the period 1948-1978, and WEIS covers the period 1966-1992. 
While the datasets differ in many significant ways, they are broadly similar
in how they track the behavior of countries towards each other (Reuveny
and Kang, 1996).  With the advent of the Goldstein scale (1992) for the
WEIS coding scheme, both datasets now have numeric values for each
event that are a measure of the degree of "cooperativeness" or "hostility"
of the event.  Thanks to the numeric scales, it is a straightforward matter to
generate comparable time series plots for the relationships.
We accessed two additional, similar datasets to obtain data more recent
than 1992.  The Levant dataset (available at http://www.ukans.edu/~keds/)
contains a chronology of dyadic, interstate events in the Middle East from
April 1979 to February 1997 (at the time of this writing) condensed to
their WEIS code values (Schrodt and Gerner, 1997).  An ancillary datafile
has those events summed for each month and converted to Goldstein scale
values.  We used the ancillary dataset.  In addition, we received data from
the PANDA dataset pertaining to a number of dyads for the period 1984 to
1995 (Bond and Bond, 1995).  These data for all but a small subset of
events had been coded to the Goldstein scale.  One of the authors
converted that subset manually; the decisions made regarding the coding
of those events are available from the authors.
From these datasets we selected the flows pertaining to the conflict
dyads that we identified from the MIDS dataset.  In combination with the
reconciliation events data, the time-series of these flows provide
information with which we can determine whether a reconciliation event
corresponded with a change in the relations between countries.  Table 1
identifies which bilateral relationships are addressed by any of the four
chronological events datasets and the reconciliation events dataset.
Table 1
Dyad End of Conflict
Reconciliation Event
1) USSR-W. Germany  5/45  8/70
2) W. Germany-Poland  5/45 12/70
3) USA-Japan  8/45  4/52
4) Japan-UK  8/45  4/52
5) China-Japan  8/45 4/52
6) India-Japan  8/45 4/52
7) France-Japan  8/45  4/52
8) Australia-Japan  8/45  4/52
9) Greece-Japan  8/45  4/52
10) New Zealand-Japan  8/45  4/52
11) South Africa-Japan  8/45  4/52
12) India-China 11/62 12/88
13) Honduras-El Salvador 7/69 10/80
14) USA-Vietnam 1/73  7/95
15) Israel-Jordan 10/73  10/94
16) Egypt-Israel 10/73  9/78
17) Ethiopia-Somalia  3/78  4/88
18) Cambodia-Vietnam  1/79  10/91
19) Uganda-Tanzania  4/79  2/81
20) Vietnam-China  3/79  10/91
21) UK-Argentina  6/82  3/90
We originally intended to perform three different types of analysis to
test our hypotheses.  The first type is simple visual analysis.  The
procedure is to plot the relationships over time that had a reconciliation,
demarcate the time of the reconciliation on the plot, and visually inspect
the plots to determine if the plots change as posited in hypotheses 1, 2, and
4.  Plotting those relationships that did not have a reconciliation and
comparing them with the first set of plots would allow for a visual
interpretation of hypothesis 3.
METHOD FOR GENERATING VISUAL ANALYSIS
One of the authors wrote FORTRAN programs to extract the
appropriate data from three of the events datasets to generate time-series
plots.  (The fourth dataset, the datafile ancillary to the Levant dataset
already had the data in the form needed for analysis.)  The programs
accomplished effectively two tasks.  The first program extracted from the
datasets those events that were directed from one selected country to
another, (for the WEIS dataset converted those events to numerical values
using the Goldstein scale4), separately summed the numerical values for
the cooperative and conflictual events for each month, and then calculated
a monthly weighted net conflict (conflict minus cooperation) measure. 
The result of running this program would be a datafile containing the
monthly cooperation, conflict, and net conflict "flows" from one country to
another for those months for which there were any events from one of the
countries to the other.
The second program "padded" the datafiles with zeros for those
months for which there were no reported events so that the plots would be
linear from the first month of recorded events within the datafile to the last
month of recorded events.5  The padded datafiles were then imported into
the JMP statistical analysis program on a Macintosh, and the time series
were plotted.  For those dyads for which we found a reconciliation event, a
line was drawn on the plots demarcating the time of the event.
The resulting plots contain "spikes" that portray the level or intensity
of cooperative, conflictual, and net conflictual interaction for each month
for which interaction was reported.  All figures used in this paper present
plots of only the net conflict measure.  The scale of the vertical axis of the
figures is not as important as is any change in the nature of the spikes
around the time of the reconciliation event.
LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA
Unfortunately, only a limited number of cases offered clear visual
evidence of the impact of reconciliation.  The temporal span or "window"
of the relationship data (mostly 1948-1992 with a few instances up to 1995
or 1997) was, in many instances, "in the wrong place" to allow for accurate
comparisons between pre- and post-conflict relations.  Of the 21
reconciliation events in the period 1948-1995, nine occurred in 1951-52
(cases 3-11 in Table 1), and two occurred in 1994-95 (cases 14 and 15 in
Table 1); periods effectively at the end of the time series plots.  In these
cases we found it impossible to determine whether there was a change in
behavior between pre- and post-conflict periods because there were
insufficient observations between 1948 and 1952 or after 1994 to provide
a sound reference point for comparison.  See Figure 1 (Japan-United
Kingdom) for illustration.  Furthermore, of the ten remaining cases, two
(cases 17 and 19 in Table 1) had insufficient data to create a meaningful
graphic representation of the relationship.6  See Figure 2
(Uganda-Tanzania) for illustration.  Because of the limited number of
workable cases, eight, we did not perform the second type of analysis,
interrupted time series analysis, or the third type of analysis, analysis of
variance.7
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
We found through visual inspection of the eight workable
reconciliation cases, five dyads where a reconciliation event signaled a
subsequent improvement in bilateral relations (cases 1, 12, 16, 18, and 20
in Table 1).  See Figures 3-7 (USSR-West Germany, India-China,
Egypt-Israel, Cambodia-Vietnam, and Vietnam-China) for illustrations. 
The three remaining cases did not provide evidence that a reconciliation
had a positive impact.  Figure 8 (United Kingdom-Argentina) serves as an
example of this outcome.  
On balance, these findings offer modest support for our first
hypothesis, that is, at least in some instances, a reconciliation event
appears to lead to improved relations between countries.
Likewise, our fourth hypothesis garners support from these graphs.  In
most cases the reconciliation event demonstrates that it is a meaningful
event by marking an inflection point in the plots and thereby signaling a
change in the dynamics of the relations between the countries.  The results
are not sufficient to make conclusions regarding our second hypotheses
because the number of positive examples are too few.  Hypothesis number
three cannot be addressed because the subsample of usable reconciled
cases is too small to be meaningfully compared with non-reconciled cases.
As a result of these findings, we believe that the effects of
reconciliation on international relations remains an open question worthy
of further investigation. The concluding section of this article offers one
possible approach to exploring what factors give rise to a  reconciliation
event and why reconciliation leads to an improvement in subsequent
bilateral relations in some cases. 
    
THOUGHTS ON FURTHER INVESTIGATION
The results of our "large n" study have accomplished two things:  (1)
provided enticing but inconclusive support for the suggestion that
reconciliation may lead to an improvement in relations between former
national belligerents; and, (2) given us a set of cases with some apparent
variance on the dependent variable: subsequent bilateral relations between
the former belligerents.  We propose, therefore, a comparative case study
of the eight instances of reconciled conflicts that appear to confirm or
disconfirm our first hypothesis to explore two questions:  (1) what factors
are likely to give rise to a reconciliation event; and, (2) when and why
does reconciliation improve subsequent bilateral relations.
An in-depth study of a small number of cases would provide certain
opportunities to explore these questions and present certain
methodological challenges.  The major challenge, of course, is the problem
of complex, multiple determinants of social phenomenon and spurious or
invalid inferences drawn from a few cases where multiple causal factors
may be at play—in short, the problem of "over-determinancy."  To control
for this problem, the case study investigation will be narrowed by the
systematic use of theories and a within-case process tracing procedure. 
General hypotheses used to explain the factors that give rise to
reconciliation and the reasons for reconciliation's beneficial impact on
subsequent bilateral relations will be drawn from relevant literature in the
social sciences and become the bases for structured comparisons between
cases.  Having used theory to establish the relevant independent variables,
within-case process tracing will attempt to identify the intervening steps or
cause-and-effect links between the independent variables and the outcome
of the dependent variable (George, 1982).  The controlled comparative
method has certain distinct advantages as well:  the problem of reliability
and validity may be smaller than in large N studies because the analyst has
a small number of cases to thoroughly consider and is less dependent on
data s/he cannot properly evaluate (Lijphart, 1975).
Specifically, the literature on negotiated ends to civil conflict offers
hypotheses that might be applied in an international context to identify the
factors that invite reconciliation events.  A phenomenon quite similar to
reconciliation between countries is reconciliation within countries
following a civil war.  For example, terms such as 'government of national
reconciliation' or 'government of national unity' have been used by
political leaders to describe their efforts (at least ostensibly) to bring in all
major political groups in order to heal the wounds of war.  Recent
examples of these governments include South Africa, Nicaragua,
Tajikistan, and Angola.
William Zartman argues that negotiated endings to civil conflict occur
when there is a symmetry of power between the combatants such that the
conflict has evolved into a mutually hurting stalemate, that is, neither side
perceives that it can achieve its original desired outcome.  A second
condition for negotiated solutions is that the stalemate is not a comfortable
place for either side.  Both sides fear continued violence, and thus a
continuation of the violence is not acceptable.  In the jargon of systems
analysis, the stalemate is an unstable equilibrium because both sides do not
want to remain there, and one way out is to negotiate a settlement
(Zartman, 1995a).  Finally, he maintains that a negotiated settlement is
more likely if both participants possess sufficient power and legitimacy to
satisfy the minimum demands of their supporters (Zartman, 1995b).  If
they lack this capacity, any agreement, even if reached, is unlikely to
endure.  Extrapolating from civil conflicts to international conflicts, this
study will consider whether these alleged preconditions for constructive
rapprochement within nations also are those that accompany international
reconciliations.
Two very different theoretical traditions generate hypotheses that
respond to the question:  "Why does reconciliation lead to an improvement
in bilateral relations?"  The first hypothesis derives from rational choice
and game theoretic approaches to explaining cooperative outcomes.  This
approach stresses that the best strategy for breaking a pattern of hostile
interactions is through the sending of signals that provide a measure of
commitment to the pursuit of improved relations (Armstrong, 1993;
Komorita, 1973; Swinth, 1967).  Reconciliation events or gestures are
particularly effective form of this type of signal because reconciliation is
costly to the participants and costly signals are  more reliable determinants
of a state's true intentions.
Reconciliation events impose costs because of their "audience effect"
(Fearon, 1990).  Leaders do not conduct foreign policy in isolation, but
before domestic and international audiences.  Concern with adverse
domestic political reaction to a reconciliation event with a former
adversary or with domestic political humiliation should a leader decide to
subsequently back down from an agreement are important domestic
audience costs associated with a reconciliation attempt.  Likewise, risking
opprobrium from third states that may disapprove of the reconciliation or
loss of international reputation should the party to a reconciliation event
retreat from the agreement also imposes significant international audience
costs associated with a reconciliation attempt.  In sum, a reconciliation
event is a costly signal that the other party is more likely to interpret as a
genuine offer to improve relations and thus may break a deadlocked
conflictual situation.  Because of the associated costs of backing away
from the reconciliation, it may also buttress initial attempts of the parties
at cooperative interaction.  
The case of the India-China reconciliation may illustrate some of these
points.  The decision by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi to visit China
in December 1988 risked his standing in domestic public opinion and
created a vulnerability in his subsequent relations  with the Chinese. 
Likewise, China's decision to receive the visit and conduct a public
reconciliation with Ghandi proved costly to its entente with Pakistan and
constrained China's subsequent freedom in negotiations with India over
issues in the bilateral relationship (Garver, 1996).
Philosophical, psychological, and legal treatments of reconciliation
offer an alternative hypothesis.  These approaches argue that important
social practices are direct outgrowths—in institutional form—of deep
human passions or emotions (Murphy and Hampton, 1988) not merely
rational calculations.  Reconciliation events, therefore, are evidence of
"forgiveness"—the process of overcoming certain psychological attitudes
(mainly the overcoming of various forms of anger or resentment).  More
positively, they represent a change of heart toward a formerly perceived
wrongdoer that opens the possibility of new beneficial relations. 
Forgiveness is not the condoning of the former belligerent's action; it is a
revision in judgment of the former belligerent itself.  The parties to a
reconciliation come to understand themselves as something other than
those incidents or traits which they do not approve.  
According to this hypothesis, although cognitive judgments and
strategy may be involved in the process of reconciliation, the process of
reconciliation also represents the overcoming of collective emotions. 
Reconciliation requires:  (1) regaining one's confidence in one's own worth
despite the actions (aggression) that may have challenged it; and, (2) the 
repudiation of emotions of resentment toward the other and the
willingness to see the other as someone other than "the one that hurt me"
(Murphy and Hampton, 1988, p. 34).
CONCLUSION
Reconciliation is a pervasive and possibly important factor in
understanding international and national politics.  It has been, for example,
integral to the experience of the United States.  President Lincoln made it
the basis for a strong federal state in his famous and eloquent Second
Inaugural Address in 1865 when he declared a reconciliation with the
Confederacy "with malice toward none, with charity for all."  President
Truman, likewise made it a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy after World
War II in America's relations with Germany and Japan.
Reconciliation, however, has yet to assume a role in scholarly thinking
about international politics.  Perhaps because of the more traditional focus
on generalizable circumstances associated with war, much less attention
has been devoted to the factors that establish a successful rapprochement
between former belligerents such as reconciliation.
This article opens the door to thinking about reconciliation in world
politics and offers a portrait of the impact of reconciliation that suggests it
may be an important factor in improving relations between former
belligerents.  This finding recommends further investigation of the factors
that give rise to reconciliation in international politics and a
theoretically-informed search for the mechanism by which reconciliation
leads to a subsequent improvement in bilateral relations.  Finally, this
study hopes to encourage other research that explores the ubiquitous, but
seldom analyzed, political phenomenon of reconciliation.
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APPENDIX A
Interstate Wars 1888-1991 from
MIDS Dataset
This file contains the interstate wars
that were fought in the time period
relevant to our events dataset, which
runs from 1948 to 1992, and the
participants of those wars as
catalogued by the MIDS dataset. 
The time period is 1888 to 1991, the
latter date because the war has to
have concluded before a
reconciliation event, and 1888
because we need some upper limit
for what can reasonably be
considered a reconciliation.  The
participants need to still be alive is a
plausible criterion, and sixty years is
a reasonable upper limit for
participants in a war to still be in
positions to make a reconciliation for
their countries.
1.  France/Thailand of 1893
- France
- Thailand
2.  Sino-Japanese War (1894-95)
- China
- Japan
3.  Greco-Turkish War of 1897
(1896-97)
- Turkey
- Greece
4.  Spanish-American War (1898)
- USA
- Spain
5.  Boxer Rebellion (1900)
- China
- USA
- United Kingdom
- Japan
- France
- Russia
6.  Occupation of Manchuria (1900)
- Russia
- China
7.  Russo-Japanese War (1903-05)
- Russia
- Japan
8.  Second Central American War
(1906)
- Guatamala
- Honduras
- El Salvador
9.  Third Central American War
(1907)
- Honduras
- Nicaragua
- El Salvador
10.  Spanish-Moroccan War of 1909
 (1909-10)
- Spain
- Morocco
11.  Italian-Turkish War (1911)
- Italy
- Turkey
12.  First Balkan War (1912-13)
- Bulgaria
- Greece
- Turkey
- Yugoslavia
13.  Second Balkan War (1913)
- Turkey
- Yugoslavia
- Bulgaria
- Greece
- Romania
14.  World War I (1914-18)
- USA
- United Kingdom
- Germany
- France
- Romania
- Turkey
- Greece
- Austria-Hungary
- Belgium
- Russia
- Bulgaria
- Italy
- Yugoslavia
- Portugal
- Japan
15.  Hungary vs. Allies War (1919)
- Hungary
- Romania
- Czechoslovakia
16.  Russo-Polish War (1919-20)
- Soviet Union
- Poland
17.  French Occupation of Cilicia
 (1919-21)
- France
- Turkey
18.  Greek-Turkish War (1919-22)
- Greece
- Turkey
19.  Lithuanian War of Independence
 (1920)
- Poland
- Lithuania
20.  China Eastern Railway Dispute
 (1929)
- China
- Soviet Union
21.  Manchurian War (1931-33)
- China
- Japan
22.  Chaco War (1931-35)
- Bolivia
- Paraguay
23.  Italy/Ethiopia (1934-36)
- Italy
- Ethiopia
24.  Marco Polo bridge (1937-41)
- China
- Japan
25.  Chankufeng War (1938)
- Soviet Union
- Japan
26.  Nomohan War (1939)
- Japan
- Mongolia
27.  Russo-Finish War (1939-40)
- Soviet Union
- Finland
28.  World War II (1939-45)
- USA
- United Kingdom
- France
- Germany
- Soviet Union
- Japan
- Poland
- Italy
- Belgium
- Norway
- Finland
- Hungary
- Bulgaria
- Romania
- Greece
- Netherlands
- Yugoslavia
- China
- Brazil
- Ethiopia
- Canada
- South Africa
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Mongolia
29.  France-Thai War (1940-41)
- France
- Thailand
30.  First Kashmir War (1947-49)
- India
- Pakistan
31.  Palestine War (1948)
- Egypt
- Iraq
- Isreal
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Syria
32.  Korean War (1950-53)
- North Korea
- South Korea
- USA
- China
- United Kingdom
- Canada
- Netherlands
- France
- Phillipines
- Greece
- Belgium
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Thailand
- Colombia
- Turkey
- Ethiopia
33.  Sinai War (1956)
- Isreal
- Egypt
- United Kingdom
- France
34.  Hungarian Revolution (1956)
- Hungary
- Soviet Union
35.  Sino-Indian War (1961-62)
- China
- India
36.  Vietnam War (1964-1975)
- USA
- South Vietnam
- North Vietnam
- Thailand
- Philippines
- Cambodia
- South Korea
- Australia
- Laos
37.  Second Kashmir War (1965)
- India
- Pakistan
38.  Six Day War (1967)
- Isreal
- Egypt
- Jordan
- Syria
39.  War of Attrition (1967-70)
- Egypt
- Isreal
40.  Football War (1969)
- Honduras
- El Salvador
41.  Bangladesh War (1971)
- Pakistan
- India
42.  Yom Kippur War (1971-73)
- Isreal
- Jordan
- Egypt
- Saudi Arabia
- Syria
- Iraq
43.  Cyprus War (1974)
- Turkey
- Cyprus
44.  Vietnamese-Cambodian War
 (1975-79)
- Vietnam
- Cambodia
45.  Ethiopian-Somalian Ogaden
War 
(1977-78)
- Ethiopia
- Somalia
- Cuba
46.  Ugandan-Tanzanian War (1978-
 79)
- Uganda
- Tanzania
- Libya
47.  Sino-Vietnam War (1978-79)
- China
- Vietnam
48.  Unnamed conflict between Isreal
 and Syria in 1980-82 (1980-82)
- Syria
- Israel
49.  Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)
- Iran
- Iraq
50.  Falklands Islands War (1982)
- United Kingdom
- Argentina
51.  Second Sino-Vietnamese War
 (1986-87)
- China
- Vietnam
52.  Persian Gulf War (1990-91)
- USA
- United Kingdom
- Syria
- Saudi Arabia
- Canada
- Egypt
- France
- Italy
- Iraq
53.  Armenia-Azerbaijani War over 
Nagorno-Karabakh (1991-94 )
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
APPENDIX B
Conflict Dyads 1888-1991
This appendix contains the country
dyads whose members have fought at
least one war against each other in
the time period relevant to the events
dataset.  These dyads thus delimit the
relationships in which we look for
reconciliation events.
1.  United States vs Spain
- Spanish American war in 1898
2.  United States vs China
- Boxer Rebellion in 1900
- Korean War
3.  United States vs Soviet 
Union/Russia
- occupation in 1918-19
4.  United States vs Germany
- WW1
- WW2
5.  United States vs Japan
- WW2
6.  United States vs Italy
- WW2
7.  United States vs North Korea
- Korean War
8.  United States vs North Vietnam
- Vietnam War
9.  United States vs Cambodia
- invasion in 1970
10.  United States vs Iraq
- war in 1990-91
11.  Japan vs China
- war in 1894-95
- Boxer Rebellion in 1900
- Manchurian war in 1931-33
- Marco Polo bridge war in 1937-
41
- World War II
12.  Japan vs Soviet Union/Russia
- Russo-Japanese war in 1903-05
- Chankufeng war in 1938
13.  Japan vs Mongolia
- Nomohan war in 1939
14.  Japan vs Germany
- WW1
15.  Japan vs Great Britain
- WW2
16.  Japan vs Philippines
- WW2
17.  Japan vs Netherlands
- WW2
18.  Japan vs Australia
- WW2
19.  Japan vs Burma
- WW2
20.  Germany vs Soviet 
Union/Russia
- WW1
- WW2
21.  Germany vs Great Britain
- WW1
- WW2
22.  Germany vs France
- WW1
- WW2
23.  Germany vs Belgium
- WW1
- WW2
24.  Germany vs Poland
- WW2
25.  Germany vs Denmark
- WW2
26.  Germany vs Norway
- WW2
27.  Germany vs Netherlands
- WW2
28.  Germany vs Portugal
- WW1
29.  Germany vs Luxembourg
- WW2
30.  Germany vs Serbia (Yugoslavia)
- WW1
- WW2
31.  Germany vs Greece
- WW2
32.  Germany vs Australia
- WW2
33.  Germany vs New Zealand
- WW2
34.  Germany vs Canada
- WW2
35.  Germany vs Romania
- WW1
36.  France vs Thailand
- war in 1893
- war in 1940-41
37.  France vs China
- Boxer Rebellion
38.  France vs Soviet Union/Russia
- occupation in 1918-19
39.  France vs Turkey
- French occupation of Cilicia in
 1919-21
40.  France vs Egypt
- war in 1956
41.  France vs Iraq
- war in 1990-91
42.  Great Britain vs China
- Boxer Rebellion in 1900
- Korean War
43.  Great Britain vs Turkey
- WW1
44.  Great Britain vs Soviet 
Union/Russia
- occupation in 1918-19
45.  Great Britain vs Italy
- WW2
46.  Great Britain vs North Korea
- Korean War
47.  Great Britain vs Egypt
- war in 1956
48.  Great Britain vs Argentina
- war in 1982
49.  Great Britain vs Iraq
- WW2
- war in 1990-91
50.  China vs Soviet Union/Russia
- Boxer Rebellion in 1900
- Occupation of Manchuria by 
Russia in 1900
- China East Railway dispute in
 1929
51.  China vs South Korea
- Korean War
52.  China vs Canada
- Korean War
53.  China vs Turkey
- Korean War
54.  China vs India
- war in 1961-62
55.  China vs Vietnam
- war in 1978-79
- war in 1986-87
56.  Soviet Union/Russia vs Austria(-
 Hungary)
- WW1
57.  Soviet Union/Russia vs Turkey
- WW1
58.  Soviet Union/Russia vs Poland
- war in 1919-20
59.  Soviet Union/Russia vs Finland
- war in 1939-40
60.  Soviet Union/Russia vs Hungary
- invasion in 1956
61.  India vs Pakistan
- war in 1947-49
- war in 1965
- Bangladesh war in 1971
62.  Turkey vs Greece
- war in 1897-98
- first Balkan war in 1912-13
- World War I
- war in 1919-20
- Cyprus war in 1974
63.  Turkey vs Bulgaria
- first Balkan war in 1912-13
- second Balkan war in 1913
64.  Turkey vs Serbia (Yugoslavia)
- first Balkan war in 1912-13
65.  Turkey vs Australia
- WW1
66.  Turkey vs New Zealand
- WW1
67.  Bulgaria vs Serbia (Yugoslavia)
- second Balkan war in 1913
- WW1
68.  Bulgaria vs Romania
- second Balkan war in 1913
69.  Bulgaria vs Greece
- second Balkan war in 1913
- WW1
70.  Czechoslovakia vs Hungary
- war in 1919
71.  Hungary vs Romania
- war in 1919
72.  Romania vs Austria(-Hungary)
- WW1
73.  Austria(-Hungary) vs Serbia
- WW1
74.  Spain vs Morocco
- war in 1909-10
75.  Poland vs Lithuania
- Lithuanian war of independence
 in 1920
76.  Italy vs Turkey
- war in 1911
77.  Italy vs Ethiopia
- Ethiopian war for independence
in
1934-36
78.  Italy vs Austria(-Hungary)
- WW1
79.  Italy vs Greece
- WW2
80.  Italy vs South Africa
- WW2
81.  Italy vs Iraq
- war in 1990-91
82.  Armenia vs Azerbaijan
- war in 1991-
83.  Israel vs Egypt
- war in 1948
- war in 1956
- war in 1967
- war of attrition in 1967-70
- war in 1973
84.  Israel vs Syria
- war in 1948
- war in 1967
- war in 1973
- conflict in 1980-82
85.  Israel vs Jordan
- war in 1948
- war in 1956
- war in 1967
- war of attrition in 1967-70
- war in 1973
86.  Israel vs Lebanon
- war in 1948
87.  Israel vs Saudi Arabia
- war in 1973
88.  Israel vs Iraq
- war in 1948
- war in 1973
89.  Iran vs Iraq
- war in 1980-88
90.  Iraq vs Syria
- war in 1990-91
91.  Iraq vs Saudi Arabia
- war in 1990-91
92.  Iraq vs Canada
- war in 1990-91
93.  Iraq vs Egypt
- war in 1990-91
94.  Ethiopia vs Somalia
- war in 1977-78
95.  Somalia vs Cuba
- war in 1977-78
96.  Uganda vs Tanzania
- war in 1978-79
97.  Tanzania vs Libya
- war in 1978-79
98.  Bolivia vs Paraguay
- Chaco war in 1931-35
99.  Guatemala vs Honduras
- war in 1906
100.  Guatemala vs El Salvador
- war in 1906
101.  Nicaragua vs Honduras
- war in 1907
102.  Honduras vs El Salvador
- war in 1969
103.  North Vietnam vs South
 Vietnam
- Vietnam War
104.  North Vietnam vs Australia
- Vietnam War
105.  North Vietnam vs New Zealand
- Vietnam War
106.  North Vietnam vs Philippines
- Vietnam War
107.  North Vietnam vs South Korea
- Vietnam War
108.  North Vietnam vs Thailand
- Vietnam War
109.  South Vietnam vs Laos
- offensive in Laos
110.  South Vietnam vs Cambodia
- offensive in Cambodia
111.  Vietnam vs Cambodia
- war in 1975-79
112.  South Korea vs North Korea
- Korean War
113.  North Korea vs Canada
- Korean War
114.  North Korea vs Turkey
- Korean War
APPENDIX C
Coding of Reconciliation Events
Dyad War # Reconciled (Y/N/P) Date
 
France - Thailand 01 Y
October, 1893
Notes/Cites:  See Virginia Thompson, Thailand:  The New Siam (New
York:  Paragon Book Reprint Corporation, 1967), p. 189; David K.Wyatt,
Thailand - A Short History (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press,
1984), p. 204.
China - Japan 02 Y
April, 1895
Notes/Cites:  Senior representatives of each government met in Japan to
sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  See Jeffrey Dorwart, The Pigtail War: 
American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895 (Amherst,
MA:  University of Massachusetts Press, 1975), pp. 85-86; See Denis
Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge History of China, v.2 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 108.
Spain - USA 04 N
April, 1899
Notes/Cites:  Representatives of senior officials from both governments
worked to draft the Treaty of Paris, which was later ratified by the
respective legislatures.  See Joseph Smith, The Spanish - American War: 
Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific (New York:  Longman
Publishing, 1994), pp. 200, 208.
China - USA 05 Y
January, 1901
China - UK 05 Y
January, 1901
China - Japan 05 Y
January, 1901
China - France 05 Y
January, 1901
China - Germany 05 Y
January, 1901
China - Russia 05 Y
January, 1901
Notes/Cites:  See William J. Duiker, Cultures in Collision - The Boxer
Rebellion (San Rafael, CA:  Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 192-195;
Christopher Martin, The Boxer Rebellion (New York:  Abelard, Schuman
Limited, 1968), pp. 210-211; Chester Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New
York:  Octagon Books Inc., 1967), pp. 184-186.
China - Russia 06 Y? -official died
March, 1902
Notes/Cites:  See Denis Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge History of China,
v.2 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 128-129.
Russia - Japan 07 Y
August, 1905
Notes/Cites:  Aided by American mediation, senior representatives from
each government met in Portsmouth, New Hampshire to work toward a
peace agreement.  The Treaty of Portsmouth brought an end to the conflict. 
See Richard Hough, The Fleet That Had to Die (New York:  Viking Press
Inc., 1958), pp. 204-205; See Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge History of
Japan, v.6 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 226.
Nicaragua - Honduras 08 Y
December, 1907
Notes/Cites:  Ministers and representatives from all involved Central
American states, the US, and Mexico met in Washington at the Central
Amercian Conference.  The Treaty of Peace and Amity resulted.  See
William S. Robertson, History of the Latin-American Nations (New York: 
D. Appleton and Company, 1932) pp. 614-615.
 
Honduras - El Salvador 09 Y
December, 1907
Nicaragua - El Salvador 09 Y
December, 1907
Notes/Cites:  Ministers and representatives from all involved Central
American states, the US, and Mexico met in Washington at the Central
American Conference.  The Treaty of Peace and Amity resulted.  See
William S. Robertson, History of the Latin-American Nations (New York: 
D. Appleton and Company,1932), pp. 614-615.
Spain - Morocco 10 Y
November, 1909
Notes/Cites:  See Edmund Burke, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: 
Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912 (Chicago, IL:  University
of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 145-146.
Italy - Turkey 11 ? - Turkey forced?
Notes/Cites:  See Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy, From Liberalism to
Fascism, 1870-1925 (London, England:  Methuen and Company, Ltd.,
1967), pp. 378-379.
Bulgaria - Turkey 12 Y? -Turkey
forced? May, 1913
Greece - Turkey 12 Y?
May, 1913
Yugoslavia - Turkey 12 Y?
May, 1913
Notes/Cites:  After an armistice in December, 1912, a conference of
ambassadors met in London to finalize a peace treaty.  The Treaty of
London was the result.  See Alan Palmer, The Lands Between (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1970), pp. 114-115; See Leslie Tihany,A
History of Middle Europe (New Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press,
1976), pp. 185-186.
Bulgaria - Yugoslavia 13 Y
August, 1913
Bulgaria - Turkey 13 Y
August, 1913
Bulgaria - Greece 13 Y
August, 1913
Bulgaria - Romania 13 Y
August, 1913
Notes/Cites:  See Leslie C. Tihany, A History of Middle Europe (New
Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 1976), pp. 185-186; See Alan
Palmer, The Lands Between (New York:  The MacMillan Company,
1970), pp. 114-115.
Necessary Conditions For Participation in World War I Conflict:
* Participants must, of their own free will, have declared war upon other
countries.
* Countries must have submitted military troops for participation in
battle-like activity.
Dyad War # Reconciled (Y/N/P) Date           
      
Germany-USA 14 Y
August, 1921
Germany-UK 14 Y
June, 1919
Germany-France 14 Y
June, 1919
Germany-Japan 14 Y
June, 1919
Germany-Italy 14 Y
June, 1919
Germany - Rumania 14 Y
June, 1919
Germany-Russia 14 Y
March, 1918
Austria-USA 14 Y
August, 1921
Austria-UK 14 Y
September, 1919
Austria-France 14 Y
September, 1919
Austria-Japan 14 Y
September, 1919
Austria - Rumania 14 Y
September, 1919
Austria-Italy 14 Y
September, 1919
Bulgaria-UK 14 Y
November, 1919
Bulgaria-France 14 Y
November, 1919
Bulgaria-Japan 14 Y
November, 1919
Bulgaria-Italy 14 Y
November, 1919
Bulgaria- Rumania 14 Y
November, 1919
Hungary-USA 14 Y
August, 1921
Hungary-UK 14 Y
June, 1920
Hungary-France 14 Y
June, 1920
Hungary-Japan 14 Y
June, 1920
Hungary - Italy 14 Y
June, 1920
Notes/Cites: See Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War (New York: 
Doubleday Books, 1995), pp.285-290; Sara Moore, Peace Without Victory
for the Allies (Providence, RI:  Berg Publishers, 1994), pp.125-127; Alan
Sharp, The Versailles Settlement:  Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (New
York:  St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1991), pp. 11, 38-41.
Hungary - Romania 15 Y
August, 1920
Hungary - Czechosloviakia15 Y
August, 1920
Peace Treaty signed by representatives of each government at Little
Trianon Castle, near Paris.  Notes/Cites:  See Ferenc Erdei, Information
Hungary (Budapest, Hungary:  Akademia Kiado, 1968), p. 274.
 
Soviet Union - Poland 16 Y
April, 1921
Notes/Cites:  See Konrad Syrop, Poland:  Between the Hammer and the
Anvil (London, England:  Robert Hale Limited, 1968), p.112.
Greece - Turkey 18 Y
August, 1920
Notes/Cites:  The Turkish Sultan met with European leaders (Greece
acting as a surrogate power for Western nations through this conflict) and
signed The Treaty of Sevres.  See Feroz, Ahmad, The Making of Modern
Turkey (New York:  Routledge Publishers, 1993), pp. 47-48; Emin
Lengyel, Turkey (New York:  Random House Publishers, 1941), pp.
377-378..
Lithuania - Poland 19 N
Notes/Cites:  See Alfred Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania,and the Vilna
Question, 1920-28 (Leiden, Netherlands:  E.J. Brill, Inc., 1966), pp.
232-234; See David M. Crowe, The Baltic States and the Great Powers
(Boulder, CO:  Westview Press Inc., 1993), pp. 5-7; Malibone W. Graham,
New Governments of Eastern Europe (New York:  Henry Holt and Co.,
1927), pp. 381-382.
China - Soviet Union 20 Y
December, 1929
Notes/Cites:  In Khabarovsk, Russia, senior offiicials from China and the
Soviet Union signed a protocol, ending the dispute.  See Raymond L.
Garthoff, Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York:  Frederick Praeger,
Inc., 1966), p. 24; Aitchen K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union (Port
Washington, NY:  Kennikat Press Inc., 1967), pp. 210-211.
Bolivia - Paraguay 22 P
July, 1938
Notes/Cites:  Treaty signed by senior officials from both governments,
meeting in Asuncion, possessed both public agreements and secret
agreements (involving territory and protocol).  See Leslie B. Rout, Politics
of the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935-1939 (Austin TX:  University of
Texas Press, 1970), pp.201-204.
Ethiopia - Italy 23 N
Notes/Cites:  See “A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974,” by Zewde,
Bahru, pp.158-160, Ohio University Press, Athens, OH.  1991.; See Chris
Prouty, “Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia (Metuchen, NJ:  Scarecrow
Press Inc., 1981) pp.103-104.
China - Japan 24 N
Notes/Cites:  Marco Polo Bridge incident escalated, later merging with the
bases of World War II. See Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China:  From
War to Peace, 1894-1972 (Chicago, IL:  Rand McNally College
Publishing, 1975)pp. 393-395, 425-427.
China - Soviet Union 25 Y
August, 1938
Notes/Cites:  See Michael T. Kikuoka, The Changkufeng Incident:  A
Study in Soviet - Japanese Conflict (Lanham, MD:University Press of
America, 1988), pp. 133, 144-148; See Alvin D. Coox, The Anamtomy of
a Small War:  The Soviet - Japanese Struggle for Changkufeng - Khasan,
1938 (Greenwood, CT, 1977), pp.307-308.
Finland - Soviet Union  27 Y
March, 1940
Notes/Cites:  The Treaty ending the conflict was signed at the Kremlin by
senior officials of both governments.  See Yohanan Cohen, Small Nations
in Times of Crisis and Coooperation (Albany, NY:  State University of
New York Press, 1989), p.316.
Neccessary Conditions For Participation in World War II Conflict:
* Participants must, of their own free will, have declared war upon other
countries.
* Countries must have submitted military troops for participation in
battle-like activity.
Dyad War # Reconciled (Y/N/P) Date
US - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
UK - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
USSR - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
China - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
France - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Australia - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Belgium - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Brazil - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Canada - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Czechosloviakia - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Ethiopia - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Greece - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
India - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Netherlands - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
New Zealand - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
Poland - Italy 28 Y
September, 1943
South Africa - Italy 28 Y
September,1943
US - Bulgaria 28 Y
February, 1947
UK - Bulgaria 28 Y
February, 1947
USSR - Bulgaria 28 Y
Febuary, 1947
Australia - Bulgaria 28 Y
February, 1947
Czechoslovakia - Bulgaria28 Y
February, 1947
Greece - Bulgaria 28 Y
February, 1947
India - Bulgaria 28 Y
February, 1947
New Zealand - Bulgaria 28 Y
February, 1947
South Africa- Bulgaria 28 Y
February, 1947
Yugoslavia - Bulgaria 28 Y
February, 1947
US - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
UK - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
USSR - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
Australia - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
Canada - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
Czechoslovakia - Hungary28 Y
February, 1947
India - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
New Zealand - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
South Africa - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
Yugoslavia - Hungary 28 Y
February, 1947
UK - Finland 28 Y
February, 1947
USSR - Finland 28 Y
February, 1947
Australia - Finland 28 Y
February, 1947
Canada - Finland 28 Y
February, 1947
Czechoslovakia - Finland 28 Y
February, 1947
India - Finland 28 Y
February, 1947
New Zealand - Finland 28 Y
February, 1947
US - Rumania 28 Y
February, 1947
UK - Rumania 28 Y
February, 1947
USSR - Rumania 28 Y
February, 1947
Australia - Rumania 28 Y
February, 1947
Canada - Rumania 28 Y
February, 1947
Czechoslovakia - Rumania28 Y
February, 1947
India - Rumania 28 Y
February, 1947
South Africa - Rumania 28 Y
February, 1947
New Zealand - Rumania 28 Y
February, 1947
US - Japan 28 Y
April, 1952
UK - Japan 28 Y
April, 1952
China - Japan 28 Y
?Feb - April 1952
India - Japan 28 Y
?Feb - April 1952
France - Japan 28 Y
April, 1952
Australia - Japan 28 Y
April, 1952
Greece - Japan 28 Y
April, 1952
New Zealand - Japan 28 Y
April, 1952
South Africa - Japan 28 Y
April, 1952
US - Germany 28 Y
May 8, 1945
USSR - Germany 28 Y
May 8, 1945
UK - Germany 28 Y
May 8, 1945
France - Germany 28 Y May 8,
1945
Note:  Reconciliation occurred with Germany through a surrender
agreement, with senior representatives of the four major Allies meeting
with executive German representatives for an official signing ceremony. 
Through this ceremony, reconciliation was officially implied to settle 
conflicts between Germany and all Allied forces.
Notes/Cites:  See Amelia C. Leiss, et. al., ed., European Peace Treaties
After World War II (Worcester, MA:  Commonwealth Press, 1954), pp.
163, 250, 251, 272, 273, 297, 298, 321, 322, 341;  Redvers, Opie, The
Search For Peace Settlements (Washington, D.C.:  The Brookings
Institution, 1951), p. 179; F.P. King, The New Internationalism:  Allied
Policy and the European Peace 1939-1945 (Hamden, CT:  Archon Books,
1973), pp. 48-51, 58-59, 76-77;  Louis L. Snyder, The War:  A Concise
History, 1939-1945 (New York:  Julian Mesner, 1960), pp. 440-443,
528-529.
France - Thailand 29 ?
March, 1941
 
India-Pakistan 30 N
N/A(See above)
Notes/Cites:  See #41 above.
Israel-Egypt 31 Y
September, 1978
Israel-Iraq 31 N
Israel-Jordan 31 Y
October, 1994
Israel-Lebanon 31 N
Israel-Syria 31 N
Notes/Cites:  See #42 above.  Regarding Lebanon, only brief cease fire in
1993, 1996.  See Mariam Shahin, “Ending the Pain,” Maclean’s, v. 109, n.
19, May 6, 1996, pp.26-27; “The Guns Stop, Not the Anger,” Economist,
v.339, n. 7964, May 4, 1996, p.44.
USA-Korea 32 N
N.Korea-S.Korea 32 N
Notes/Cites:  Agreement in 1994 between U.S.-DPRK on nuclear
program.  Some working level exchanges in 1992-93.  Regarding
North-South Korea, some exchanges in 1990-92 as high as Prime
Minister.  See Winston Lord, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,”
U.S. Department of State Dispatch, v. 7, n. 14, April 1, 1999, pp. 165-68;
Mel Gurtov, “South Korea’s Foreign Policy and Future Security: 
Implications of the Nuclear Standoff,”  Pacific Affairs, v. 69, n. 1, Spring
1996, pp.8-31.
Israel-Egypt 33 Y
September, 1978
U.K.-Egypt 33 N
France-Egypt 33 N
Notes/Cites:  See #42 above.  Nothing conclusive in UK-Egypt or
French-Egyptian relations.  UN solution to Suez, no formal declaration of
war or rapprochement.  Informally, ties between Egypt and West improve
after 1978.
Hungary-Soviet Union 34 N(?)
Notes/Cites:  1956, Prime Minister Imre Nagy removed by invading Soviet
forces, 1957 Janos Kadar installed, supports pro-Soviet line.  Agrees to
“temporary” installation of Soviet forces in Hungary.  1958, Nagy is
hanged.  Kadar is ousted in 1988.  Democratic government elected in
1990.  See Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark, and Iver B. Neumann eds.,
The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-89 (New York:  St. Martin’s
Press, 1994); Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: 
The Great Challenge (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1990);
Richard F. Staar, ed., East-Central Europe and the USSR (New York:  St.
Martin’s Press, 1991).
China-India 35 Y
December, 1988
Notes/Cites:  December 1988, Rajiv Gandi visits Beijing, Li Peng returns
trip in 1991, pace of rapprochement increases in early 1990s.  E.g., troop
reductions on border, confidence-building  steps.  See Sandy Gordon,
“South Asia after the Cold War:  Winners and Losers,” Asian Survey, v.
35, n. 10, October 1995, pp. 879-895; Wang Hong Yu, “Sino-Indian
Relations:  Present and Future,” Asian Survey, v. 35, n. 6, June 1995, pp.
546-54; Mohan J. Malik, “China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: 
The Continuing Rivalry,” China Quarterly, n. 142, June 1995, pp. 317-55.
USA-Vietnam 36 Y
July, 1995
Notes/Cites:  See Winston Lord, “A New Phase in U.S.-Vietnam
Relations,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, v. 6, n. 28, July 10, 1995,
pp.555-56; BrantlyWomack, “Vietnam in 1995:  Success in Peace,” Asian
Survey, v. 36, n. 1, January 1996, pp.73-82; Warren Christopher, “The
U.S. and Vietnam:  Establishing Diplomatic Relations,”  U.S. Department
of State Dispatch, v. 6, n. 33, August 14, 1995, pp.629-32.
India-Pakistan 37 N
Notes/Cites:  See #41 above.
Israel-Egypt 38 Y
September, 1978
Israel-Jordan 38 Y
October, 1994
Israel-Syria 38 N
Notes/Cites:  See #42
Egypt-israel 39 Y
September, 1978
Notes/Cites:  See #42
Honduras-El Salvador 40 Y
October, 1980
Notes/Cites:  Hostilities resume in 1976.  On October 30, 1980 respective
secretaries of state meet in Lima, Peru and publicly sign a peace treaty to
resolve their territorial disputes.  In 1986, the countries agree to submit
their border dispute to the International Court of Justice.  A Court decision
is rendered in 1992.  See “Honduras, El Salvador Settle Border
Dispute--World Court Decides Contested Area,” Facts on File World
Digest, September 24, 1992, p.709 A2; “Honduras, El Salvador Ties
Restored,” Facts on File World Digest, November 14, 1980, p. 872 C3.
Pakistan-India 41 N
Notes/Cites:  see George Perkovich, “India, Pakistan, and the United
States:  The Zero-Sum Game,”  World Policy Journal, v. 13, n. 2, Summer
1996, pp.49-55.
Israel-Jordan 42 Y
October, 1994
Israel-Egypt 42 Y
September, 1978
Israel-Saudi Arabia 42 N
Israel-Syria 42 N
Israel-Iraq 42 N
Notes/Cites:  See Al Jarbawi, “The Triangle of Conflict,” Foreign Policy,
no.100, Fall 1995, pp.92-108; Bruce W. Nelson, “Waiting for the
Holdout,” Time, v. 144, n.6, August 8, 1991, pp.42-43; Jimmy Carter,
Keeping Faith (New York:  Bantam Books, 1982).
Turkey-Cyprus 43 N
Notes/Cites:  See Celestine Bohlen, “Dividing Line Freezes Mutual Fears
in Cyprus,”  The New York Times, August 19, 1996, p.A2.
Vietnam-Cambodia 44 P
October, 1991
Notes/Cites:  In August 1989, Vietnamese officials meet face-to-face with
representatives of Cambodia’s factions (Sihanouk, Sun Sen, And Khmer
Rouge), no agreement.  Vietnam voluntarily withdraws trrops from
Cambodia in 1989.  In 1991, Paris Peace accord Phase I agreed to by
warring parties, election held.  Khmer Rouge faction withdraws from
peace accord, resumes armed struggle.  Sihanouk elected, sharing power
with Sun Sen (Vietnam’s supported faction leader).  See “Sihanouk
Becomes King of Cambodia--Sun to Lead Govenment,” Facts on File
World Digest, September 30, 1993, p.475 E1; “Factions Agree to Partially
Disarm,”  Facts on File World Digest, September 26, 1991, p.793 A1;
“Vietnam Announces Cambodia Exit Date--Troops to be Pulled Out by
September,” Facts on File World Digest, April 7, 1989, p.231 D1;
“Cambodia Factions Meet Face-to-Face, Talks Held in Indonesia,” Facts
on File World Digest.  August 5, 1989, p.567 D2.
Ethiopia-Somalia 45 Y
April, 1988
Notes/Cites:  January 18-19, 1986 Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile
Mariam and Somalia’s Said Barre meet in Djibouti.  Negotiations final in
April 1988 with a peace treaty, withdrawal of forces, and agreement to
repair diplomatic relations.  See Jeffrey A. LeFebvre, Arms for the Horn
(Pittsburgh:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp.245-47.
Uganda-Tanzania 46 Y
February, 1981
Notes/Cites:  Overthrow of Amin regime by Tanzanian supported rebels. 
By May 1990, former President Obote returns from exile in Tanzania and
is elected President.  In February 1981, regional leaders in Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania meet to agree torevitalize regional cooperation.  See Robert
I. Rotberg, Africa in the 1990’s and Beyond (Alsanac, MI:  World Peace
Foundation 1988); Arthur S. Banks, Alan J. Day and Thomas C. Muller,
Political Handbook of the World (Binghamton, NY:  CSA Publications,
1996).
China-Vietnam 47 Y
October, 1991
Notes/Cites:  See #51
Syria-Israel 48 N
Notes/Cites:  See “Syria:  Keep Your Distance,” Economist, v. 338, n.
7951, Feb. 3, 1996, p.34; Stanley K. Sheinbaum, “Bring Assad Into the
Fold,” New Perspectives Quarterly, v. 131, n. 1, Winter 1996, p.72.
Iran-Iraq 49 N
Notes/Cites:  See “Allies in Adversity,” Economist, v. 335, n. 7918, June
10, 1995, p.15; Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign
Affairs, v. 73, n.2, March 1994, pp.44-55.
U.K.-Argentina 50 Y
March, 1990
Notes/Cites:  UN meetings, Madrid meetings; diplomatic exchange
reestablished, will peacefully resolve territorial dispute.  Sovereignty issue
not yet resolved.  See “The Falkland-Ending the Affair,” Economist, v.
1For example, the term "reconciliation" often appears in the vocabulary of actors within states emerging from bouts of
traumatic internal violence.  Cases of of that term being used following intrastate violence include instances of state
collapse (Chad and Uganda in the 1980s), civil war (El Salvador and Cambodia in the 1980s and 1990s), severe
repression by military regimes following their coming to power through coups (Chile and Argentina in the 1970s),
313, n. 7626, October 28, 1989, p.39; “Best of Friends Again Almost,”
Economist, v. 319,n. 7711, June 15, 1991, p.30.
China-Vietnam 51 Y
October, 1991
Notes/Cites:  1991 Summit of premiers leads to 11-pt. communique
normalizing relations.  “America and Asia:  New Friends, New Enemies,” 
Economist, v. 336, n. 7923, July 5, 1995, p.24; Carlyle A. Thayer,
“Sino-Vietnamese Relations,”  Asian Survey, v. 34, n. 6, June 1994,
pp.513-28; Brantly Womack, “Sino-Vietnamese Border Trade,” Asian
Survey, v. 34, n. 6, June 1994, pp.495-512.
Iraq-USA 52 N
Iraq-UK 52 N
Iraq-Syria 52 N
Iraq-Saudi Arabia 52 N
Iraq-Canada 52 N
Iraq-Egypt 52 N
Iraq-France 52 N
Iraq-Italy 52 N
Notes/Cites:  See Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The
Lessons of the Modern War, vol. 4:  The Gulf War (Boulder:  Westview,
1996); Peter Reuilherade, “Optimism From Baghdad,” Middle East, n.
243, March 1995, pp.26-27; Avner Gidron, “The Road to Damascus,”
World Press Review, v. 40, n. 12, December 1993, p.35.
Armenia-Azerbijan 53 N
Notes/Cites:  See “ A Fearful Calm in the Caucasus,” Economist, v. 337,
n. 7940, Nov.11, 1995;  “Russia’s Caucasian Cauldron,” Economist, v.
332, no. 7875, August 6, 1994, pp.34-40; Steven Shabad,
“Nagorno-Karabakh:  Obstacles to Peace,” World Press Review, v. 41, no.
3, March 1994, p.35.
and struggles that led to regime overthrows (Nicaragua in the 1970s and South Africa in the apartheid era).
2
The notion of international society (or society of states) we take from Hedley Bull (1977, p.13).  According
to Bull, international society "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of
rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common institutions." 
3
It is worth noting that this question dovetails with recent work on rivalries and, in particular, rivalry termination
(Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Thompson, 1995; Bennett, 1996; Bennett, 1997a; Bennett, 1997b, Bercovitch and Diehl,
1997; and Gibler, 1997) in that reconciliation is one form or pathway of rivalry termination.
4
The Goldstein scale contains numeric values for 61 WEIS events.  The version of WEIS we received in the Fall of
1996 contains 63 events.  The two new events are 022 [COM2] Pessimistic comment on situation and 024 [COM4]
Optimistic comment on situation.  We gave event 022 a value of -0.5 and event 024 a value of 0.5.
5
The source code for the FORTRAN programs can be found on the Web site for Brecke
(http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/reconcile.html).
6
There are, in our estimation, two possible explanations for cases with insufficient data to generate a
post-reconciliation graph.  First, cooperative events are not reported as much in the media as are conflictual events,
and thus they are relatively poorly represented in the datasets, particularly COPDAB and WEIS.  Improvements in
the relations between countries manifested in trade or other business agreements, for example, often do not pass the
threshold of "newsworthiness" for a newspaper such as The New York Times and as a result are not reported.  If these
events are not reported, an improvement in relations will not appear in the time series plots.  This is particularly
problematic for WEIS because it is based almost exclusively on The New York Times, and international coverage,
especially of events like trade deals in Africa, by The New York Times has been declining in recent years
(Tomlinson, personal communication in 1996).  Second, the datasets, especially COPDAB and WEIS, suffer from
unevenness in their coverage of different parts of the world, which results in a lack of reported events for certain
dyads even though there was almost certainly interaction.  For a number of dyads that experienced a reconciliation in
the 1948-1992 time frame such as Tanzania and Uganda in 1981, there simply were not enough reported events,
hostile or cooperative, between the countries such that one could assert relations had changed.
7The second type of analysis consists of performing interrupted time-series analysis on the dyadic flows with
reconciliation events being an intervention that "interrupts" a time series (McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger,
and Hay, 1980).  Specifically, if time-series estimation for individual dyads with an intervention
representing a reconciliation event results in a better statistical fit than estimation of those same dyads
without the intervention being represented, and if the mean value for the relationship following the
reconciliation event is higher than it was before the reconciliation, that finding would support hypothesis 1. 
Obviously, this finding would need to occur for a high proportion of the dyads with reconciliation events for
this form of analysis to be evidence for hypothesis 1.
The third type of analysis is to perform analysis of variance with the non-reconciliation dyads serving
as one subsample and the dyads with reconciliation serving as the other subsample.  If there is a difference
between the non-reconciliation and reconciliation subsamples in their average increase between immediate
post-conflict relations and relations at a later time (with that later time sufficiently long to enable all
reconciliation events to be incorporated), and that the difference is such that the reconciliation subsample
exhibits the larger increase, that would be evidence for hypothesis 3.
Similarly, hypothesis 2 can be tested by comparing the long-term pre-conflict mean value of a
relationship against a comparable post-conflict mean value that begins sufficiently subsequent to the end of
the conflict for reconciliation events to have taken place.  If the subsample of reconciliation cases exhibits
no difference compared to the non-reconciliation subsample, that is evidence supporting hypothesis 2.
